I have been remiss in not mentioning this on the blog sooner, but in case you missed it, here is a link to the Handigrappling debate on Gallop-Outs I had with Ed DeRosa of Brisnet.
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I promise, I’m almost done talking Moneyball BUT I did enjoy this review (from an actual film reviewer and wanted to share it.
Also, I am a fan of Gregg Easterbrook’s work, though I certainly don’t always agree with him. In his Tuesday Morning Quarterback column this week he writes about the book/film. His first theory is nonsense but then he gets it right. I’ll paste the relevant portion here but you should should check out the whole piece:
It is also possible that Beane fell victim to “commoditization,” which happens with increasing speed in a globalized environment. This would mean Beane did in fact have an important insight, but his idea has been copied by most if not all MLB franchises, turning the idea into a mere commodity that, possessed by everyone, confers no advantage.
Here’s what your columnist wrote about commoditization in my 2009 book “Sonic Boom”: “A generation ago, a company that came up with a novel product might have decades of a business to itself, because it would take that long for other companies to hear about the idea, gear up to copy it, then learn to produce facsimiles close enough in quality that buyers would be happy with them. With each passing year, this process accelerates. Free-flowing information makes it easier for businesses to find out what is being done successfully, and imitate success.
“When IBM pioneered the desktop PC, for years the company had that market nearly to itself; then competitors jumped in, offering similar machines. By 1996, when Dell began to sell its own brand of PCs direct to consumers via the Web, IBM’s core idea had been commoditized, transformed from something unique that could only be made by one firm into a commodity made by many. In commodity markets, price governs most decisions — if competing products are about the same, why not pick the cheapest? The commoditization of the PC led to IBM’s departure from that business; IBM pioneered the idea but couldn’t be the lowest-cost producer, so bowed out. As the world become more global, commoditization will happen faster and faster.”
Commoditization is a reason the international economy grows more productive and simultaneously more turbulent — when some business has a good idea, the rest of the world learns to imitate that idea with increasing alacrity. In Beane’s case, once the book “Moneyball” was published in 2003, the rest of baseball had a road map — available for $27.95 in a bookstore — on how to apply sabermetrics to free agency decisions. The idea was commoditized, and the A’s sunk back into mediocrity.”
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What else? I really enjoyed Catching Hell, the ESPN doc about Bill Buckner and Steve Bartman, and recommend that you check it out. One point that I want to make, however, is that I simply do not buy the idea that *every* fan would have interfered with that ball. Yes, most would. My initial estimate (on Twitter) of 80% might even be low. But there are educated fans who would have actually tried to prevent other fans from interfering in that instance. I do not offer this to pile on poor Bartman, however. The guy was largely a victim of randomness, knew he made a mistake, apologized appropriately, and was never allowed to live the same life. I found this heartbreaking, and the film captured the story well.
Three observations:
1) Bartman was apparently listening to the broadcast on a 7-second delay on his infamous headphones. Now why would someone do this? Ever try it? Incredibly disorienting, no wonder he was so confused. Home radio broadcasts should ALWAYS be in synch with live. The whole thing might have ended differently.
2) The story about how he was wearing the sweatshirt of the youth baseball team he coached literally brought tears to my eyes. Just gutting stuff.
3) Seeing the dumb Red Sox fans with the “We Forgive You Bill Buckner” sign still infuriates me. As the great Josh Wilker has pointed out, the sign should have read, “Forgive Us Bill Buckner.” And, no, I still haven’t seen this season of Curb.
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It should be a busy few days around here as I aim to do previews and lines for all the SuperSaturday stakes at Belmont. So check back often starting late tomorrow.
Did you read this piece by Barra? Excellent stuff: http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/09/the-many-problems-with-moneyball/245769/?single_page=true
Indeed I’ve read. Allen’s obviously a really smart guy and the historical stuff about competitive balance is interesting but I disagree in a big way with a lot of what’s here, especially the big point he reiterates from the Hirsch book. Hudson, Mulder and Zito, while not “sleepers,” were in fact drafted as high as they were based on a core tenet of the Beane philosophy, the preference for older, college pitchers over higher ceiling high school prospects. I don’t think there’s any air in that particular baloon.
Also, I don’t buy the OBS line of thinking either. As Moneyball states (can’t be bothered to look it up so this is approximate), OBP is a factor of several (4 maybe?) more important than SLG.
While it’s certainly a valid point that different skills might amplify in importance in the postseason versus the regular season, these things pale in importance to the role luck plays. It’s like a card counter at a casino. Over time, he wins for sure. Over five hands, anybody’s guess. To use the 0-9 in clinchers “stat” is muggish, small sample size nonsense. (There is no objective, special significance to why those games would be different than other playoff games).
For a more objective measure of Beane’s success, look at the A’s over-under during those years — they exceeded it every year. Could that, too, be small sample size nonsense? If you’re one of the people who think so, I’d like to book your baseball bets for as long as you’re solvent.
I think you’re both right, actually. Yes, Barra selectively uses small sample sizes, but I also think merely writing it off to luck is a cop-out. He’s right when he points out that those teams were pretty terrible at doing things like catching the ball and running the bases. Over the grind of the season, their excellent OBP skills would always win them a lot of games, especially over teams with a more benighted outlook, despite those deficiencies. However, in the post-season, you’re facing other top-tier teams in a highly pressurized scenario and those flaws can often come to the fore in a way you don’t need to worry about on July 17th against the Indians. I’m not saying that the A’s failure in the post-season was due to a systemic flaw, necessarily, just that it can’t all be written off to bad luck. (I’m also thinking about the far more expensive Yankees of the mid-00s, a team that had OBP coming out of its ears and won a ton of games, but had trouble with things like catching and throwing.) Their regular season success, well obviously – res ipsa loquitor.
Obviously Barra is a fan of advanced metrics and more sophisticated talent evaluation, I think he’s really just suggesting that the reality is far messier and more multi-faceted than either Lewis, Beane or their antagonists would suggest.
I think that’s a fair assessment. Thanks so much for taking the time to comment, and to do so in such a thoughtful manner. I’ve always wanted to use these comments as more of a conversation than I have been able to, and that can’t happen without the exchange of interesting ideas like yours and Allen’s.
FWIW, I think that run of Yankee teams that didn’t win was definitely very unlucky, and the 1996-2000 run was very much luck fueled (not that they weren’t usually the best team, but nobody can be expected to win playoff games at the rates those teams did, just as no team that won as many games as they did from 2001 on can be expected to lose as many as they did in that run). I do believe that certain teams have certain qualities that make them more or less likely to win in a balls out situation like the playoffs, but I also think it’s worth a small percentage (5% maybe?) and you might go broke trying to identify and bet those teams prima facie. I get the bad baserunning issue, Imagine if Jeremy Giambi (who most definitely DID NOT join the A’s in 2002 like in the movie) had slid? But I think it’s the type of thing that seems way magnified with the benefit of hindsight. People like explanations where a lot of times I just see randomness. I think a lot of it just comes down to how you view the world.
I think there’s a huge degree of randomness. However, generally when you’re facing another excellent team, you’re seeing better pitching and you’re less likely to win your PS games 13-4 and more likely to be in a 4-2 game (note: this is a total generalization and I have neither the time nor inclination to research the game scores and see if this assumption holds water). I think in terms of betting those teams, yeah, you’d be nuts to try to identify it (although it does seem like bad defensive teams rarely win the WS, doesn’t it?). The old cliche was that pitching & defense win championships – yeah, maybe sometimes and maybe more so in the post-season, but high OBP and SLG will win you 90+ games in the regular season like clockwork.
I also think Lewis, given the nature of what he does, had to craft the facts into a narrative that people would want to read. Otherwise, you’ve got a textbook or a BP article that only weirdos like us would want to read.
I do also think that Lewis gave short-shrift to the Yankees and Gene Michael. Beane focused on how to identify and use undervalued assets, but Michael had been building the Yankees in the image of high OBP guys in the very early 90s. Of course, Earl Weaver had been preaching OBP since the 60s.
And Branch Rickey before that. . .the Alan Schwarz book, THE NUMBERS GAME, is a cool one to check out if you don’t already know it. Your point is dead on, if you want to write a nonfiction book that’s entertaining, you have to both leave some stuff out and also vary your brushstrokes in a way that plays to the narrative.
And even more so to make an effective 2 hour movie!
Yes, to do that with nonfiction you pretty much have to make shit up.
If they can do it routinely with things like, oh, you know…WORLD WAR II, then the Oakland A’s of the 00s are really not worth breaking a sweat over.
LOL. Indeed.